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Abstract
Decision quality is often evaluated based on whether decision makers can adequately explain the decision process. Account-
ability often improves judgment quality because decision makers weigh and integrate information more thoroughly, but it could
also hurt judgment processes by disrupting retrieval of previously encountered cases. We investigated to what degree process
accountability motivates decision makers to shift from retrieval of past exemplars to rule-based integration processes. This
shift may hinder accurate judgments in retrieval-based configural judgment tasks (Experiment 1) but may improve accuracy
in elemental judgment tasks requiring weighing and integrating information (Experiment 2). In randomly selected trials,
participants had to justify their judgments. Process accountability neither changed how accurately people made a judgment,
nor the judgment strategies. Justifying the judgment process only decreased confidence in trials involving a justification.
Overall, these results imply that process accountability may affect judgment quality less than expected.
Keywords: judgment, accountability, cognitive processes.
1 Introduction
Providing a satisfying explanation for one’s judgment plays a
major role in professional life. Court decisions usually state
the reasons for judgment, university teachers have to provide
arguments for their grades upon request, and business de-
cisions are evaluated by law by the degree they were taken
on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the best interest
of the company. Psychological research generally defines
accountability as "the implicit or explicit expectation that
one may be called on to justify one’s beliefs, feelings, and
actions to others" (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999, p. 255).Usually,
two types of accountability are differentiated: outcome and
process accountability (Langhe, Van Osselaer, & Wierenga,
2011; Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996). Whereas performance
evaluation on the basis of outcome usually seems to produce
negative side-effects, performance evaluation based upon
the judgment process can benefit performance in a range of
tasks (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; DeCaro, Thomas, Albert, &
Beilock, 2011).
Yet, process accountability may prove advantageous only
if people have to weigh and integrate all pieces of informa-
This research was supported by Swiss National Science Foundation
Grant 100014_146169/1.
All material and the data can be downloaded from the Open Science
Framework (Hoffmann, Gaissmaier, & von Helversen, 2017).
Copyright: © 2017. The authors license this article under the terms of
the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.
∗Department of Psychology, Postbox 146, University of Kon-
stanz, Universitaetsstrasse 10, 78 468 Konstanz, Germany. Email:
janina.hoffmann@uni-konstanz.de.
†University of Basel
‡Max Planck Institute for Human Development
§University of Zurich
tion. Process-accountable participants use more information
to make a judgment (Kahn&Baron, 1995), but also consider
irrelevant information more often (Siegel-Jacobs & Yates,
1996). Similarly, Langhe et al. (2011) found that process
accountability improved performance only in multiple-cue
judgment tasks in which people deliberately weigh and in-
tegrate information in a rule-based fashion, but not in tasks
solved by retrieving past instances from memory.
Taken together, tasks demanding weighing and integrat-
ing information benefit from process accountability, but it
remains unclear why tasks demanding memory retrieval do
not. The current paper aims to understand when and why
process accountability helps or hurts judgments. Specifi-
cally, holding people accountable for the judgment process
may evoke a preference for thoroughly weighing and inte-
grating information. We suggest that this strategy shift, in
turn, influences how accurately the judgment task will be
solved.
2 Judgment strategies inmultiple-cue
judgment tasks
In multiple-cue judgment tasks, the judge evaluates an object
on a continuous scale using a number of attributes (or cues).
When judging students’ essays, for instance, the teacher de-
termines the grade (the criterion) based on indicators of
quality (i.e., the cues) such as coherent reasoning or good
writing style.
Evidence has accumulated that people employ two kinds
of judgment strategies: cue abstraction and exemplar mem-
ory (Juslin, Karlsson, & Olsson, 2008; Hoffmann, von Hel-
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versen, & Rieskamp, 2014; von Helversen & Rieskamp,
2008). Cue abstraction strategies assume that people try
to understand how each cue relates to the criterion, weigh
each cue by its importance and then integrate them to a final
judgment. For instance, teachers may emphasize the co-
herence of the reasoning over formal criteria. In contrast,
exemplar-based strategies assume that people retrieve infor-
mation about previously stored exemplars when judging a
new instance. The higher the similarity of a stored exemplar
to the to-be judged object, the more this past exemplar in-
fluences the final judgment. For instance, tutors could judge
students’ essays based on example cases they received from
the professor.
Past research suggests that people select among those two
strategies depending on task properties and the cognitive
abilities of the decision maker (Hoffmann, von Helversen, &
Rieskamp, 2013; Hoffmann et al., 2014; Juslin et al., 2008;
Mata, von Helversen, Karlsson, & Cüpper, 2012; von Hel-
versen, Mata, & Olsson, 2010). Specifically, people tend to
rely on cue abstraction strategies in elemental judgment tasks
in which the criterion is a linear function of the cues (Juslin
et al., 2008; Hoffmann, von Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2016),
and to rely on exemplarmemory in configural judgment tasks
in which the criterion is a non-linear function of the cues
(Juslin et al., 2008; Hoffmann et al., 2013). Furthermore,
putting a cognitive load on the decision maker limits the
ease with which rules can be tested and motivates exemplar
retrieval (Hoffmann et al., 2013) suggesting that participants
processing the information more thoroughly may likewise
engage in a qualitatively different judgment strategy.
3 Effects of process accountability on
judgment strategies
How should process accountability interact with judgment
strategies? Langhe et al. (2011) argued that process account-
ability boosts cue abstraction, but leaves exemplar mem-
ory unaffected. Specifically, process accountability may
increase the motivation to thoroughly understand the de-
cision process (De Dreu, Beersma, Stroebe, & Euwema,
2006; Langhe et al., 2011). Processing the available infor-
mation more systematically may in turn benefit performance
in tasks in which cue abstraction is a viable strategy. In line
with this hypothesis, Langhe et al. (2011) found that process
accountability increased judgment accuracy in an elemen-
tal judgment task. The consistency of the cue abstraction
strategy in describing judgments explained this performance
increase, given that participants scoring low on a rationality
scale applied the cue abstraction strategy more consistently
when they were process accountable.
It remains unclear, however, how process accountability
affects exemplar memory. Langhe et al. (2011) reasoned
that, if exemplars are automatically stored and retrieved from
memory, processing the available information more system-
atically may not help. Consistent with this idea, judgment
accuracy did not vary between process and outcome account-
ability in a configural, quadratic task (Langhe et al., 2011).
Alternatively, process accountability may induce a shift
towards a cue abstraction strategy in both elemental and
configural tasks. In linewith this idea, awareness of the judg-
ment process has been shown to foster a preference for rule-
based processes in categorization (DeCaro et al., 2011; Mc-
Coy, Hutchinson, Hawthorne, Cosley, & Ell, 2014). Specif-
ically, videotaping participants’ performance hurts category
learning in information-integration tasks, but not in rule-
based tasks (DeCaro et al., 2011). Performance likely de-
creased because participants abandoned implicit strategies
more often and considered two- and three-dimensional rules
instead. Unfortunately, Langhe et al. (2011) did not inves-
tigate which judgment strategies underlie accuracy in the
configural, quadratic task and current research still debates
if people solve this task by storing exemplars or drop back
to an unsuccessful cue abstraction strategy (Hoffmann et al.,
2016; Olsson, Enkvist, & Juslin, 2006; Pachur & Olsson,
2012). As it stands, it is still an open question whether
process accountability left exemplar memory unaffected or
whether it motivated a higher reliance on cue abstraction.
4 Rationale of the experiments
The current experiments tested whether holding decision
makers accountable for the judgment process counteracts
exemplar-based processing and instead fosters cue abstrac-
tion. If so, process-accountable participants should approach
a configural judgment task by cue abstraction and thus solve
configural tasks less accurately (Experiment 1). In elemental
tasks (Experiment 2), however, this preference for cue ab-
straction should help process-accountable participants solve
the judgment task more accurately. To foreshadow our re-
sults, our experiments do not provide any support for the
hypothesis that process accountability invokes a higher re-
liance on cue abstraction, neither in a configural exemplar-
based task, nor in an elemental task. Justifications neither
harmed judgments in a configural task nor benefitted judg-
ments in an elemental task.
5 Experiment 1: Accountability in a
configural judgment task
To test our prediction, we manipulated the need to justify
one’s judgment process while participants learned to solve a
multiple-cue judgment task. In the accountability condition
participants had to explain their judgments after randomly
selected trials so that another person would be able to repro-
duce their judgments. Prompting justifications at random
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 12, No. 6, November 2017 Effect of process accountability on accuracy and strategy 629
(rather than a single justification at the end) should motivate
participants more in each single trial to explicitly reason
about the judgment process. Further, providing a justifica-
tion directly after the judgment reduces retrospection and
increases validity of the justification (Lagnado, Newell, Ka-
han, & Shanks, 2006).
Like Langhe et al. (2011) we chose a configural task,
but selected a multiplicative task that more reliably induces
exemplar-based processes (Hoffmann et al., 2014, 2016).
To pin down the strategy changes unique to justification,
we compared the justification condition to one control con-
dition without any accountability instruction and one with
verbalization instructions because a mere verbalization of
judgment processes may interfere with non-verbal processes
too (Schooler, 2002; Deshon, Chan, & Weissbein, 1995;
Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990). Finally, we asked
for confidence ratings after every trial, although we did not
specify a hypothesis in advance for these.
5.1 Method
5.1.1 Participants
Out of 153 participants from the participant pool of theMax-
Planck-Institute for Human Development, Berlin, we had to
discard 9 incomplete data sets due to error, leaving a sample
of 144 participants (80 female, MAge = 25.4, SDAge = 3.3).
Participants received an hourly wage of 13 e as well as a
performance-dependent bonus (M = 2.90 e, SD = 0.84 e).
5.1.2 Design and Material
In the adapted judgment task from Hoffmann et al. (2016),
participants estimated the toxicity of a bug (the criterion) on
a scale from 0 to 50 mg/l. The criterion y was predicted
by four quantitative cues, x1,..., x4 with cue values ranging
from 0 to 5, that were combined multiplicatively:
y =
4x1 + 3x2 + 2x3 + x4 + 2x1x2x3 + x2x3x4
8.5
(1)
We used the same items in the judgment task as in previous
studies (Hoffmann et al., 2014, 2016, Appendix A). The
items were selected so that an exemplar strategy allowed
to more accurately judge the old training items than the
cue abstraction strategy and that the new validation items
discriminated among the judgment strategies.
The pictorial stimuli displayed bugs varying on four visual
features: the length of their legs, their antennae, and their
wings, and the number of spots on their back. These visual
features could be used to predict the bug’s toxicity. The
cues x1,..., x4 were randomly assigned to the visual features
(e.g., antennae). Higher cue values were always associated
withmore salient visual features. For instance, a cue value of
zero on the cue ’legs’ corresponded to a bugwithout (visible)
legs, whereas a bug with a cue value of five had long legs.
5.1.3 Procedure
Participants were first instructed that they will learn to pre-
dict the toxicity of different bugs during the training phase.
Additionally, participants in the justification condition were
informed that they would have to justify their judgments so
that another person could make the same judgments based
upon their descriptions (see Appendix B for verbatim trans-
lations of the instructions). In the verbalization condition,
participants were informed that they will have to subdivide
their judgments into its components.
Next, we introduced a practice task to help participants
imagine what information they (or another person in the
justification condition) would need to accurately judge the
bugs’ toxicity. In this task, participants saw a bug with
different cues and had to indicate the information they would
need to accurately judge the bugs’ toxicity based only upon
a verbal description.
The subsequent judgment task consisted of a training and a
test phase. During training, participants learned to estimate
the criterion values for 25 training items. In each trial,
participants first saw a bug and estimated its toxicity. Next,
participants rated their confidence by estimating how much
their answer deviated from the correct judgment.1 Finally,
they received feedback about the correct value, their own
estimate, and the points earned. Training ended after 10
training blocks, with 25 training items presented in random
sequence in each block.
In 20 of these 250 judgment trials, the experimental trials,
participants justifying their judgment had to explain their
judgment so that another person could make the same judg-
ment, but without mentioning the specific judgment value.
Participants in the verbalization condition indicated how
much each cue contributed to the total toxicity. Verbal-
izations and justifications occurred randomly twice in each
training block, directly after the judgment (see Figure 1).
Thus participants could not know beforehand in which trials
they would need to justify (or verbalize) their judgment.
In the subsequent test phase, participants judged 15 new
validation items four times and indicated their confidence but
did not receive any feedback. Further, participants neither
verbalized, nor justified their judgments.
To motivate a high performance, participants could earn
points in every trial. The points earned were a truncated
quadratic function of the deviation of their judgment j from
the criterion y:
Points = 20 − ( j − y)
2
7.625
(2)
This incentivization scheme was communicated to partici-
pants in the instructions: "Every correct estimate will earn
you 20 points. Almost correct estimates will earn you less
1We collected response and processing times, but we did not postulate
any effect of justification on response times, nor did we analyze the response
times.
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Figure 1: Trial sequence for experimental (left sequence) and control trials (right sequence). In the experimental trials,
participants in the justification condition had to justify their judgment after they made a judgment, whereas participants in the
verbalization condition indicated how much each cue contributed to the total amount of toxicity.
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points. If you deviate from the correct value by more than
12 points, you will not earn any points." At the end of the
experiment, the points earned were converted to a monetary
bonus (4000 points = 1 e). In addition, participants earned
a bonus of 2 e if they reached 80% of the points in the
last training block (corresponding to less than 5.5 RMSD
[root mean square deviations]). Verbalization questions and
justifications were incentivized, too. Participants in the ver-
balization condition could gain 20 additional points for each
verbalization question if the importance assigned to each cue
summedup to their judgment. Participants in the justification
condition could win one Amazon voucher worth 50 ewith
higher chances of winning the more closely another person
approximated the judgment based upon their justification.2
5.2 Results
Bayesian analyses were performed in R (R Core Team, 2016)
to quantify evidence for and against the null hypothesis with
Bayes Factors (BF, calculated with the BayesFactor Pack-
age and the specified defaults priors in this package Morey,
Rouder, Jamil, & Morey, 2015). BFs express the relative
likelihood of one hypothesis over another one in light of the
data. BFs above 3 provide moderate evidence, BFs above 10
provide strong evidence for the alternative hypothesis (Lee&
Wagenmakers, 2014; Jeffreys, 1961). BFs below 1 provide
evidence for the null hypothesis.
5.2.1 Does justification decrease judgment perfor-
mance?
Participants learned to solve the judgment task equally well
in all conditions (see Figure 2 and Table 1 for descriptive
2To measure how closely another person approximated the judgment of
the participant, we randomly selected five justifications for each participant
(320 justifications in total). In a later study, a rater judged the bug based
upon the justification and the corresponding picture. All justifications were
randomly interspersed, stated judgment values replaced by "XX" and the
rater was aware that justifications were generated by different participants.
statistics). Most participants reached the learning criterion,
and learning success did not vary between conditions (BF =
0.058, using a Bayesian test for contingency tables assuming
independent multinomial sampling with a Gunel and Dickey
prior with prior concentration set to 1).
To test if justification decreased judgment accuracy com-
pared to the verbalization and the control condition, we per-
formed a repeated measures Bayesian ANOVA on judgment
error, measured in RMSD between participants’ judgments
and the correct criterion in each block, with the factors train-
ing block and condition.3 Judgment error dropped in all
conditions from the first to the last training block (BFBlock,0
> 10000), but justifying judgments did not increase judgment
error (BFCond,0 = 0.182), nor did the need to justify or ver-
balize judgments change learning speed (BFBlock x Cond,Block
= 0.031). A corresponding Bayesian ANOVA on judgment
error in test found no evidence that justifying judgments
decreased judgment accuracy more than in the control con-
ditions (BFCond,0 = 0.180). In sum, participants learned to
make accurate judgments with more training blocks, but jus-
tifications did not decrease judgment accuracy in training or
test.
5.2.2 Judgment strategy and accuracy
To better understand on which judgment strategy partici-
pants based their judgment, we fitted three judgment models
to participant’s judgments in training and predicted their
judgments in test (see Appendix C and Hoffmann et al.,
(2014, 2016)): a cue abstraction, an exemplar, and a guessing
model. As expected, most participants were best described
by an exemplar model in the control condition (see Table
2 for strategy classification and performance by strategy),
but strategies did not change depending on the condition
3In the Bayesian ANOVA, g-priors are assumed for the effects and
independent scaled inverse-chi-square priors with one degree of freedom
and a corresponding scaling parameter r are placed on g (Morey et al.,
2015; Rouder, Morey, Speckman, & Province, 2012) with r = 1/2 for the
fixed and r = 1 for the random effects.
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Figure 2: Judgment error in the training phase (left plot) and the test phase (right plot) measured in Root Mean Square
Deviations (RMSD) in Experiment 1, separately for participants in the justification (dark grey circles), the verbalization (light
grey squares), and the control condition (white diamonds). Error bars show ± 1 SE.
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(BF = 0.002, Bayesian test for contingency tables assuming
independent multinomial sampling).
Did the chosen strategy influence how accurately and con-
sistently participants judged the test items? To quantify how
strategy choice affected accuracy in the test, we included
judgment strategy as an independent variable in the ANOVA
on accuracy. Participants best described by guessing were
excluded in all analyses involving strategy choice. Overall,
participants classified to the exemplar model were more ac-
curate in the test (BFStrategy,0 = 2379), but justification did
not affect judgment error (BFCond,0 = 0.143). Finally, people
assigned to a cue abstraction model in the justification or
verbalization condition did not make more errors in the test
than participants assigned to the cue abstraction model in
the control group (BFStrategy x Cond,Strategy = 0.027). Because
justification may also affect how consistently participants
judge the same items (Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996), we per-
formed a corresponding analyses on judgment consistency,
measured as the average correlation between the judgments
in the test blocks. The results on consistency mimic the
pattern for accuracy. Cue abstraction users made less con-
sistent judgments in the test (BFStrategy,0 = 8.2), but neither
justification (BFCond,0 = 0.069) nor its interaction with judg-
ment strategy affected consistency (BFStrategy x Cond,Strategy =
0.028). In sum, justification did not lead to a shift to cue ab-
straction and did not change how accurately or consistently
participants judged the new items.
5.2.3 Post-hoc analyses of confidence ratings and justi-
fications
So far, we found no evidence that justifying the judgment
process alters judgment performance. Confidence ratings
and the stated justifications may provide further information
about whether our prompt to justify one’s judgment changed
the judgment process.
Previous research considering confidence ratings suggests
that participants who have to justify their judgments are on
average better calibrated (Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996) and
less overconfident (Tetlock & Kim, 1987). If justifications
had any effect on judgment strategy in our experiment, the
need to justify one’s judgment should at minimum reduce
confidence for judgments on the same trial because confi-
dence ratings directly followed justifications. Justifications
may also affect confidence in trials before or after the jus-
tification, but this would be a smaller effect. Hence, par-
ticipants in the justification condition should have indicated
that their judgments further deviated from the correct crite-
rion in trials in which they had to justify their judgment than
in preceding or subsequent trials without the justification
prompt. To test this possibility by considering only relative
decrements in judgment confidence, we first z-standardized
participants’ confidence ratings for each item across all par-
ticipants and trials in the training phase. Next, we averaged
these confidence ratings for each participant, separately for
trials preceding the justification (or the verbalization ques-
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Table 1: Performance in Experiment 1 (Configural Task) and Experiment 2 (Elemental Task). Standard Deviations in Paren-
theses.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Justification Verbalization Control Justification Control
(n = 49) (n = 47) (n = 48) (n = 55) (n = 55)
Training session
Error first block 10.4 (4.0) 9.4 (2.5) 9.5 (2.6) 9.8 (3.0) 8.9 (2.3)
Error last block 5.5 (3.5) 5.2 (1.9) 5.1 (1.7) 5.3 (2.0) 5.0 (2.0)
Bonus n 39 (79.6%) 38 (80.9%) 42 (87.5%) 38 (69.1%) 44 (80.0%)
Guessing n 4 3 2 1 2
Test session
Mean error 6.2 (3.0) 5.7 (1.8) 5.5 (1.9) 6.2 (1.9) 5.8 (1.7)
Mean confidence
Training first block 4.5 (2.8) 3.8 (1.8) 3.8 (1.6) 6.1 (4.0) 5.3 (2.3)
Training last block 3.2 (1.5) 3.4 (1.8) 3.3 (1.2) 4.2 (2.1) 4.0 (1.6)
Test 3.3 (1.5) 3.5 (1.7) 3.4 (1.5) 4.4 (1.8) 4.6 (2.5)
z-Confidence
Pre-trial 0.02 (0.71) −0.01 (0.71) −0.03 (0.55) 0.06 (0.68) −0.09 (0.50)
Trial 0.21 (0.90) −0.01 (0.68) 0.01 (0.55) 0.27 (0.85) −0.09 (0.49)
Post-trial 0.01 (0.63) −0.04 (0.69) −0.04 (0.56) 0.01 (0.57) −0.09 (0.49)
Note: Error in the judgment tasks was measured in root mean square deviation. The
bonus reports the number (or percentage) of participants reaching the learning criterion.
Confidence ratings asked participants how far their judgment deviated from the correct
judgment.
tion), trials that contain a justification, and trials after the
justification (we refer to the different trials as trial type). For
participants in the control condition, we randomly selected
two trials in each training block and used the trials preceding
or following it as a comparison.
Table 1 depicts z-standardized confidence ratings in each
condition, separately for each trial type. Descriptively, par-
ticipants in the justification condition are on average less
confident on trials in which they had to justify their judg-
ment, than on trials in the control or the verbalization con-
dition; still, the difference is small, as indicated by an in-
crease of only 0.2 SD compared to the average confidence.
A repeated measures ANOVA suggested that participants
in the justification condition were not generally less confi-
dent about their judgments (including all trials, BFCond,0 =
0.33). However, participants were less confident in trials
with a justification than in trials preceding or following a
justification (BFTrial type,0 = 22.5). How strongly confidence
changed as a function of trial type depended on the con-
dition (BFCond x Trial type,0 = 9.8), but BFs could not clearly
distinguish whether only trial type influences confidence or
whether the trial type plays a stronger role in specific condi-
tions (BFCond x Trial type,Trial type = 0.435).
In a follow-up analysis, we therefore put equality con-
straints on trial type, separately for each condition, that is, we
conducted the same repeated measures analysis but did not
allow confidence to vary in one of the conditions. Next, we
compared this constrained model against the unconstrained
repeated measures analysis. BF above 1 indicate a prefer-
ence for the constrained model. Assuming no change in
confidence was acceptable for the control condition (BF =
5.2) and the verbalization condition (BF = 10.4), but not in
the justification condition (BF < 0.001). In sum, this result
suggests that participants who had to justify their judgment
were less confident in trials including this justification, but
participants who had to verbalize their judgment were not.
(Of course, the control condition showed no such effect of
trial type, by design, since trials were selected randomly.)
Finally, we rated how often participants provided reasons
in their justifications (a binary rating) andwhich reasons they
provided (see Appendix D for methodology and summary
statistics). Providing reasons more often did not correlate
with participants’ success in solving the judgment task at
the end of training (M = 70.2% of trials, SD = 38.1% of
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Table 2: Performance and Strategy Consistency Separately for Participants Classified to Each Strategy (Cue Abstraction or
Exemplar) in Experiment 1 (Configural Task) and Experiment 2 (Elemental Task). Standard Deviations in Parentheses.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Justification Verbalization Control Justification Control
Strategies
Guessing 1 (2 %) 0 (0 %) 0 (0 %) 2 (3.6 %) 1 (1.8 %)
Cue abstraction 24 (49 %) 17 (36.2 %) 21 (43.8 %) 43 (78.2 %) 48 (87.3 %)
Exemplar 24 (49 %) 30 (63.8 %) 27 (56.2 %) 10 (18.2 %) 6 (10.9 %)
Test session (Mean Error)
Cue abstraction 6.9 (3.8) 7.1 (1.7) 6.2 (2.4) 6.3 (1.9) 5.5 (1.6)
Exemplar 5.3 (1.5) 4.8 (1.2) 5.0 (1.2) 5.6 (1.1) 7.4 (2.1)
Consistency r
Cue abstraction 0.87 (0.37) 0.81 (0.33) 0.85 (0.39) 0.83 (0.39) 0.84 (0.32)
Exemplar 0.88 (0.48) 0.90 (0.32) 0.89 (0.38) 0.81 (0.33) 0.74 (0.41)
Note: Error in test session was measured as the root mean square deviation.
trials, r = 0.112). In a linear model, we predicted judg-
ment error during training with the percentage of reasons
stated for participants in the justification condition. The
linear model indicated only that participants were more ac-
curate in later training blocks (BFBlock,0 > 10000), but the
percentage of reasons stated did not influence judgment er-
ror (BFBlock+Reason,Block = 0.602), nor its interaction with
training blocks (BFBlock*Reason,Block+Reason < 0.001). Also, a
quality index, expressing howmuch information participants
provided in their justifications, did not predict judgment ac-
curacy at the end of training (M = 0.43, SD = 0.19, r =
-0.029).
5.3 Discussion
In sum, neither process accountability nor verbalization de-
creased judgment accuracy in the configural task compared
to a control group receiving only outcome feedback. Fur-
thermore, process accountable participants did not shiftmore
towards cue abstraction strategies, contradicting our initial
hypothesis and previous work in category learning (DeCaro
et al., 2011). Potentially, this shift is more pronounced in
categorization because participants can form explicit if-then
rules based on one or more cues, whereas the cue abstraction
strategies in judgment demand additive linear integration of
cues. Exploratory analyses indicated that participants were
slightly less confident after a justification, suggesting that
participants at least reconsidered their judgment strategy.
Our results resonate better with the finding that justifying the
judgment process compared to justifying the outcome does
not affect accuracy in configural, quadratic tasks (Langhe
et al., 2011). In combination, these results hint at the in-
terpretation that justifying one’s judgment process does not
interfere with more automatic retrieval from exemplar mem-
ory (Langhe et al., 2011).
If automatic retrieval of exemplars underlies the null ef-
fect of process accountability, one would expect process ac-
countability to improve judgments in an elemental task that
is better solved by cue abstraction. Yet, the beneficial ef-
fects of process accountability may be also overstated. In
this vein, Siegel-Jacobs and Yates (1996) found that hold-
ing participants accountable for the process failed to affect
judgment accuracy and only improved calibration (Exp. 1)
or discrimination (Exp. 2). We address this question in
experiment 2.
6 Experiment 2: Accountability in an
elemental judgment task
In elemental judgment tasks, the benefits of process over
outcome accountability are well documented (Langhe et al.,
2011; Ashton, 1990, 1992). In three experiments, Langhe et
al. (2011) provided convincing evidence that justifying the
judgment process improves accuracy more than justifying
the outcome. Similarly, stating reasons for one’s judgment
can promote a higher judgment accuracy even in the ab-
sence of social pressure (Ashton, 1990, 1992). Strategy
preferences at the end of training unlikely account for this
improvement because the majority of participants is best de-
scribed by cue abstraction (Hoffmann et al., 2014). Still,
process-accountable participants may develop a preference
for cue abstraction earlier in training, as a consequence settle
on their final judgment policymore quickly and apply the cue
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Figure 3: Judgment error in the training phase (left plot) and the test phase (right plot) measured in Root Mean Square
Deviations (RMSD) in Experiment 2, separately for participants in the justification (dark grey circles) and the control condition
(white diamonds). Error bars show ± 1 SE.
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abstraction strategy more consistently (Ashton, 1990, 1992;
Langhe et al., 2011). In Experiment 2, we expected that
process-accountable participants apply the cue abstraction
strategy more consistently compared to a control condition
without accountability and, hence, should make more accu-
rate judgments in an elemental judgment task.
6.1 Method
6.1.1 Participants
A hundred-ten participants (58 females,MAge = 25.6, SDAge
= 6.0) from the University of Basel received an hourly wage
of 20 CHF (Swiss Francs) for their participation as well as
a performance-dependent bonus (M = 5.49 CHF, SD = 1.59
CHF).
6.1.2 Material, Design, and Procedure
Compared to Experiment 1, we changed the function relating
the cues to the criterion. Specifically, the judgment criterion
y was a linear, additive combination of all cues:
y = 4x1 + 3x2 + 2x3 + x4 (3)
Themonetary incentivewas converted to Swiss Francs (1500
points = 1 CHF) and participants earned additionally 3 CHF
if they reached 80 % of the points in the last training block.
6.2 Results
6.2.1 Does justification increase judgment perfor-
mance?
Participants on average learned to solve the judgment task
well and justifications did not affect the number of partic-
ipants reaching the learning criterion (BF = 0.475, see Ta-
ble 1 for descriptive statistics and Figure 3). To investi-
gate if justifying one’s judgment improved judgment accu-
racy, we performed a repeated measures Bayesian ANOVA.
This analyses suggested that, on average, judgment error
dropped in both conditions from the first to the last train-
ing block (BFBlock,0 > 10000). Yet, BFs did not provide
enough support for or against an undirected effect of justi-
fication (BFBlock + Cond,Block = 0.560). Therefore, we tested
more strictly the directional hypothesis by setting order con-
straints. This test rejected the idea that justification increases
judgment accuracy (BF = 0.209). In addition, justifying
one’s judgment did not speed up learning compared to the
control condition (BFBlock x Cond,Block = 0.003). In the test, a
directional Bayesian t-test also rejected the idea that justifi-
cation enhanced judgment accuracy compared to the control
group (BFCond,0 = 0.091). In sum, participants held account-
able for the judgment process did not outperform participants
in the control condition in training or in test.
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6.2.2 Judgment strategy and accuracy
As expected, most participants were best described by a
cue abstraction model (see Table 2), but no more partic-
ipants were best described by cue abstraction in justifica-
tion than in the control condition (BF = 0.056). In addi-
tion, process-accountable participants who followed a cue
abstraction strategy did not make more accurate or more
consistent judgments in the test. Including judgment strat-
egy in the ANOVA on judgment error indicated neither that
participants classified to cue abstraction were more accu-
rate (BFStrategy,0 = 0.379), nor that justification improved
judgment accuracy (BFCond,0 = 0.393), nor that judgment
strategy affected judgment accuracy differently depending
on justification (BFStrategy x Cond,0 = 0.749). Similarly, how
consistently participants judged the test items was not influ-
enced by judgment strategy (BFStrategy,0 = 0.740), justifica-
tion (BFCond,0 = 0.205), or the interaction (BFStrategy x Cond,0
= 0.072). In sum, these results suggest that process ac-
countable participants were no better described by a cue
abstraction strategy, nor did the pursued strategy increase
the accuracy and consistency of process accountable partici-
pants — potentially because the majority of participants was
classified as using the cue abstraction strategy.
6.2.3 Post-hoc analyses of confidence ratings and justi-
fications
Descriptively, justifying one’s judgment reduced confidence
directly after the justification; still, the effect was small. A
repeated measure ANOVA did not indicate that justifications
made participants less confident per se (BFCond,0 = 1.2), but
all participants were less confident directly after a justifica-
tion (BFTrial,0 = 68.8). Importantly, participants justifying
their judgment were less confident directly after the justi-
fication, but participants in the control condition were not
(BFTrial Type x Cond,Trial Type = 140.9).
Analysis of the justifications indicated that success on the
judgment task neither correlated with how often participants
provided reasons (M = 56.2%, SD = 40.8%, r = 0.021),
nor with the quality of the reasons stated (M = 0.38, SD =
0.23, r = −0.158). Furthermore, predicting judgment error
across training in a linear model suggested that participants
were more accurate only in later training blocks (BFBlock,0
> 10000), but the percentage of reasons stated did not in-
fluence judgment error (BFBlock+Reason,Block = 0.403), nor its
interaction with training blocks (BFBlock*Reason,Block+Reason <
0.001).
7 General Discussion
Giving reasons for decisions is a common duty in profes-
sional life. Such justifications may give insight into the
judgment process and have been implemented as tools to
improve judgment quality. Yet, our major results indicate
that asking for a justification affects the decision process and
judgment quality less than expected (Langhe et al., 2011). In
two experiments, participants justified their judgments after
randomly selected learning trials. In the first experiment,
we expected justifications to encourage a higher reliance on
cue abstraction and, consequently, harm performance in a
configural judgment task that is better solved by exemplar
memory. In a second experiment, we expected justifications
to prove beneficial in an elemental task in which a cue ab-
straction strategy leads to a better performance. Yet, in both
experiments, justifications did not encourage a more consis-
tent use of a cue abstraction strategy, nor did justifications
impede or profit judgment accuracy.
Our null results contradict the previously found beneficial
effects of process accountability (Langhe et al., 2011; Lerner
& Tetlock, 1999; but see Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996).
These previous studies mostly contrasted process with out-
come accountability, whereas our study distinguished pro-
cess accountability from a judgment process without ac-
countability instructions. Matching our findings, a few pre-
vious studies found no evidence that process accountabil-
ity benefits accuracy more than a no-accountability control
in rule-based tasks (DeCaro et al., 2011; Siegel-Jacobs &
Yates, 1996). Jointly considered, these results hint at the in-
terpretation that outcome accountability worsens judgment
performance and causes the difference between process and
outcome accountability in elemental tasks.
Alternatively, the few justifications required may not have
motivated participants enough to change their judgment pol-
icy compared to previous research (DeCaro et al., 2011).
In both experiments, participants justifying their judgment
process were not more likely to adopt a cue abstraction strat-
egy, nor were their judgments more consistent. Yet, process
accountable participants were slightly less confident directly
after a justification, indicating that justifications only made
people doubt their judgments. In addition, a lack of insight
into one’s own judgment policy may hinder a change to-
wards cue abstraction (Haidt, 2001; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999;
Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Matching this idea, the quality
of justifications did not correlate with judgment accuracy
in our study and participants mentioned mostly superficial
characteristics instead of deeply reflecting upon the judg-
ment process. Potentially, asking more fine-grained ques-
tions about the judgment process may help participants to
accurately reflect on, and ultimately change, their judgment
policy (Lagnado et al., 2006).
Another limitation is potentially that we incentivized ev-
ery trial and offered a bonus for reaching the learning cri-
terion. First, some studies combined the possibility to win
a bonus with social pressure to induce outcome account-
ability (DeCaro et al., 2011) and thus all our judgment tasks
may involve some aspects of outcome accountability as well.
Second, the chance to win a bonus itself (compared to los-
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ing a bonus) may induce a promotion focus and change how
participants approach a judgment task (Grimm, Markman,
Maddox, & Baldwin, 2008; Maddox, Baldwin, &Markman,
2006). In this vein, categorization research has found that
participantswho gain points on every trial and expect a bonus
were closer to the optimal reward criterion than participants
who expected to lose their bonus (Markman, Baldwin, &
Maddox, 2005). Different incentivization schemes may al-
ter how effectively people solve a judgment task, too, but
research on incentivizations in judgment is rare (Ashton,
1990).
The impact of process accountability likely depends on
its implementation, too. Past manipulations ranged from an-
nouncing a later report to a final interview to videotaping
the judgment process (Langhe et al., 2011; DeCaro et al.,
2011). Those manipulations vary in the frequency and tim-
ing of expected justifications or the social pressure involved.
For instance, we induced social pressure by explaining that
justifications will be reviewed by another person, but an ex-
pected interview with another person may have increased
social pressure more strongly. Future research shall investi-
gate more systematically which factors make people reliably
feel accountable for the decision process and thereby aid
practioners to successfully implement justifications as tools
improving decision quality.
Taken together, our experiments provide little support for
the common idea that providing a satisfying explanation to-
wards others makes people weigh and integrate all informa-
tion more systematically, which could improve or decrease
performance depending on the structure of the decision task.
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Appendix A: Items used in judgment
task
Appendix B: Instructions
Below we list the instructions participants received in each
condition. Instructions were translated into English in a
verbatim fashion.4
Instructions in the justification condition
"In this task, it is of particular importance that you not only
make a judgment, but are also able to well justify and explain
these judgments. For this reason, we will randomly prompt
you after some of your judgments to accurately justify and
explain your judgment in written form so that another per-
son is able to reproduce your judgment and reaches the same
judgment. The other person will see the bug and your jus-
tification and likewise makes a judgment based upon this
information. The closer the judgment of the other person
reaches your judgment, the higher is your probability to win
an amazon voucher amounting to 50 e. Please consider that
the other person does not possess any prior knowledge about
the judgment task and will not see the justifications in the
same order as you do. Therefore, you should describe your
approach for EVERY justification in as much detail and as
accurately as possible; a simple classification of the bug as
toxic or not toxic will not suffice. Describe which informa-
tion you used for your evaluation and how they led to the
judgment. However, note that you should NOT state your
judgment in the justification but only the steps towards the
judgment. If your judgment is anticipated in the written
justifications, you will not participate in the lottery of the
Amazon voucher. Reason and justify thus properly."
4German versions are here, in Appendix B.
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Table 3: Training items in Study 1 (multiplicative criterion)
and Study 2 (linear criterion). The judgment criterion y was
derived from Equation 1 (Study 1) and Equation 3 (Study 2).
Cue values Criterion y
x1 x2 x3 x4 Study 1 Study 2
2 1 0 3 2 14
1 4 1 4 5 22
0 3 1 2 2 13
0 2 3 0 1 12
5 5 4 0 29 43
0 4 5 4 12 26
2 4 3 0 9 26
1 4 3 5 13 27
1 0 2 4 1 12
1 0 0 2 1 6
5 3 3 5 21 40
1 1 5 5 7 22
1 2 0 5 2 15
5 5 0 1 4 36
0 4 3 1 4 19
4 2 1 3 6 27
0 5 2 3 6 22
5 5 2 4 22 43
5 1 3 4 9 33
4 0 2 4 3 24
1 4 1 5 6 23
3 0 5 5 3 27
0 2 5 0 2 16
1 5 2 4 10 27
3 4 5 5 30 39
Instructions in the verbalization condition
"In this task, it is of particular importance that you not only
make a judgment, but are also able to explain what these
judgments comprise. For this reason, we will randomly
prompt you after some of your judgments to enter for each
individual cue of the bug how many ml of toxin this cue
contributed to the total toxicity of the bug. Your judgment
of the total toxicity should thus result from the ml toxin that
each individual cue contributes. If you can accurately state
how much toxin each individual cue contributes, you will
earn 20 points additionally. To do so, click on the box left to
each cue with the mouse, enter the value, and confirm your
response with ENTER. Enter a value for each cue."
Table 4: Validation items in Study 1 (multiplicative criterion)
and Study 2 (linear criterion). The judgment criterion y was
derived from Equation 1 (Study 1) and Equation 3 (Study 2).
Cue values Criterion y
x1 x2 x3 x4 Study 1 Study 2
3 5 1 4 10 33
3 4 4 3 21 35
5 0 3 4 4 30
3 4 2 5 14 33
5 0 5 5 4 35
3 2 0 2 2 20
2 3 4 0 9 25
4 5 4 5 36 44
5 0 5 3 4 33
4 3 0 1 3 26
2 1 2 0 3 15
2 5 2 3 12 30
4 0 0 2 2 18
4 1 1 1 4 22
3 3 3 5 15 32
Instructions for the confidence ratings
"In addition, you will be asked after each bug how much
you think the response you provided deviates from the real
toxicity of the bug. For instance, if you estimated 17 mg/l,
but consider it possible that the toxicity of the bug ranges
between 15 ang 19mg/l, enter 2mg/l as the response, because
both 15 mg/l and 19 mg/l deviate from your estimate by 2
mg/l."
Appendix C: Cognitive modeling of
judgment strategies
We followed the same cognitive modeling approach as in
Hoffmann et al. (2014) to characterize participants’ judgment
strategies in both experiments. For each participant, we
described and predicted participants’ judgments with three
judgment strategies: a cue abstraction strategy modeled by a
linear regressionmodel, an exemplar-based strategymodeled
by an exemplar model and a guessing strategy (estimating
participants’ average judgment).
Cue abstraction strategies have been predominantly cap-
tured by linear regression models (Juslin, Olsson, & Olsson,
2003; Cooksey, 1996). The cue weights wi reflect how
important each cue i is for making a judgment. The final
judgment jˆp for an object p is determined as the sum of the
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Table 5: Model Fits in the Last Three Training Blocks and in Test for Each Strategy (Guessing, Cue Abstraction, or Exemplar)
in Experiment 1 (Configural Task) and Experiment 2 (Elemental Task). Standard Deviations in Parentheses.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Justification Verbalization Control Justification Control
Model Fit Training
Guessing 7.5 (1.5) 7.3 (1.1) 7.3 (1.0) 9.5 (1.0) 9.4 (1.0)
Cue abstraction 4.4 (0.8) 4.4 (0.9) 4.4 (0.7) 4.2 (1.5) 4.1 (1.3)
Exemplar 4.8 (3.3) 4.5 (1.3) 4.3 (1.1) 5.0 (1.7) 4.8 (1.6)
Model Fit Test
Guessing 7.8 (2.1) 7.2 (1.4) 7.7 (1.7) 8.8 (1.7) 8.6 (1.4)
Cue abstraction 5.3 (1.5) 5.2 (1.0) 5.6 (1.4) 5.5 (1.9) 5.1 (1.6)
Exemplar 6.1 (3.1) 4.9 (1.8) 5.3 (2.1) 7.2 (2.5) 6.5 (2.1)
Note: Model fit was measured in root mean square deviation between participants’ judg-
ments and the model-predicted judgments.
cue values xpi over all cues I weighted by their importance
jˆp = k +
I∑
i=1
wi · xpi (4)
where k is a constant intercept.
The exemplar strategy assumes that judging a new object
relies upon a similarity-based retrieval of the criterion values
associated with each exemplar. Tomodel exemplar-based re-
trieval, we used an exemplar model with one free sensitivity
parameter (Juslin et al., 2003). The similarity S
(
p, q
)
be-
tween probe p and exemplar q is an exponential function of
the objects’ distance dpq (Nosofsky & Zaki, 1998):
S(p, q) = e−dpq (5)
This distance is determined by summing up the absolute
differences between the cue values xpi of the probe and
the cue values xqi of the exemplar on each cue i and then
weighting this sumover all cues I by the sensitivity parameter
h:
dpq = h
( I∑
i=1
|xpi − xqi |) (6)
Correspondingly, the more closely the cue values of the
probe and the exemplar match, the smaller the distance is be-
tween the objects. The sensitivity parameter expresses how
strongly people discriminate among the stored exemplars. A
sensitivity parameter close to 0 indicates no discrimination; a
high parameter indicates that people specifically remember
each exemplar. The estimated judgment jˆp is then deter-
mined as the average sum of the similarities weighted by
their corresponding criterion values yq over all exemplars
Q,
jˆp =
Q∑
q=1
S(p, q) · yq
Q∑
q=1
S(p, q)
(7)
We estimated each model’s parameters based on partici-
pants’ judgments in the last three training blocks by mini-
mizing the RMSD between participants’ judgments and the
model-predicted judgments and used the parameter estimates
to predict participants’ judgments in the four test blocks. This
generalization test accounts for model complexity not only
in terms of the number of free parameters but also in terms
of their functional form (Busemeyer & Wang, 2000). The
items for this generalization test were selected in advance to
discriminate between the models (Hoffmann et al., 2014).
Descriptively, the cue abstraction strategy and the exem-
plar model described and predicted participants’ judgments
on average better than the guessing model in both experi-
ments (see Table 5). In the configural task, the exemplar
model described participants’ judgments as well as the cue
abstraction strategy at the end of training, but predicted par-
ticipants’ judgments slightly better than the cue abstraction
model in the verbalization and the control condition in the
test phase. In the elemental task, the cue abstraction strategy
more accurately described participants’ judgments at the end
of training and also predicted participants’ judgments better
in the test phase.
Appendix D: Coding of justifications
After data collection, we asked two raters to judge the quality
of participants’ justifications on a range of dimensions. Each
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Table 6: Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) for Rated Justifications.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Interrater reliability
Mean SD Mean SD Cohen’s κ
Participants 49 — 55 —
Cues (average n mentioned) 2.6 1.0 3.0 0.9 0.91
Toxicity (% of trials) 59.0 41.0 35.3 36.4 0.81
Direction (% of trials) 43.1 34.0 33.5 36.5 0.63
Weighing (% of trials) 8.6 18.4 14.7 27.3 0.72
Combination (% of trials) 51.8 37.7 39.8 39.4 0.51
Calculations (% of trials) 0.8 4.5 7.8 25.4 0.54
Exception (% of trials) 5.3 12.3 1.8 4.7 0.29
Earlier Bugs (% of trials) 6.5 14.7 1.8 4.7 0.78
Metacognitive thoughts (% of trials) 3.9 14.6 0.7 2.6 0.52
Reason stated (% of trials) 70.2 38.1 56.2 40.8 0.84
Details (average) 3.3 0.9 3.1 1.1 *0.79
Imagery (average) 2.1 0.8 2.0 0.6 *0.73
Quality (average) 3.4 1.3 3.0 1.4 *0.81
Note: *Values represent Pearson correlations.
rater coded 10 justifications from each participant, with one
justification randomly drawn fromeach block, without know-
ing from which experiment and participant the justification
originated. The first four ratings involved descriptive aspects
asking how many cues participants mentioned (0 to 4 cues),
whether participants mentioned the overall toxicity level (bi-
nary), the direction of the relationship between the cues and
the toxicity level (binary), and the importance of the cues
(binary). Next, four questions were designed to better cap-
ture strategic aspects asking whether participants mentioned
that combining several cues wasmore important than the sin-
gle cues (binary), whether participants explained a way to
calculate their judgment (binary), if participants mentioned
that the specific bug represented an exception (binary), and if
theymentioned any previously encountered bugs in their jus-
tification (binary). Furthermore, the raters made two global
binary judgments involving if the justification included any
metacognitive thoughts and if the description actually com-
prised any reasons for the judgment. The binary rating if
the justification comprised any reasons was used to discrim-
inate pure descriptions of the bug from justifications stating
reasons why a bug is more or less toxic. Although partici-
pants often described the bug instead of providing reasons,
they rarely entered no justification at all. In addition, raters
made three global judgments on a Likert scale asking how
detailed the description was (7-point Likert scale from 1 =
"no details" to 7 = "many details") or how figurative the de-
scription was (7-point Likert scale from 1 = "prosaic" to 7 =
"figurative"), and finally raters judged the overall quality of
the justification by considering how helpful the justification
was for deriving a judgment (7-point Likert scale from 1
= "useless" to 7 = "very helpful"). Example justifications
highlighted typical statements representing each category.
Interrater reliability was satisfying formost descriptive as-
pects of the ratings, but lower for questions capturing strate-
gic aspects (Table 6 summarizes interrater reliability and
descriptive statistics). In particular, ratings did not agree on
the classifications of exceptions, potentially because partici-
pants mentioned only vaguely in their justifications that the
object under consideration has to be judged differently than
all the other ones. In case of such conflicts, a third rater
judged the justifications again. The last three global ratings
(Details, Imagery, and Quality) were averaged across the
two raters. Finally, we normalized all ratings to a range be-
tween 0 and 1 and summarized the four descriptive questions
(Cues, Toxicity, Direction, Weighting) and the global quality
rating within a quality index ranging from 0 (justifications
did not include any information) to 1 (justifications included
information about the cues, the toxicity, the weighting, the
direction, and a global quality rating).
Among those justifications for which participants stated
reasons participants primarily mentioned that combining
several cues was important and slightly considered a combi-
nation of cues more often in the configural task from Exper-
iment 1 (M = 62.0%, SD = 35.5%) than in the elemental task
from Experiment 2 (M = 57.9%, SD = 40.7%). Stating a
rule for calculating the judgment seldom happened, but was
slightly more pronounced in the elemental task (M = 9.8%,
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SD = 28.3%) than in the configural one (M = 0.9%, SD =
5.0%). Finally, participants rarely mentioned earlier bugs
or exceptions in their justifications, nor did the percentage
of references vary between the configural task (Bugs: M =
7.3%, SD = 15.4%, Exceptions: M = 6.6%, SD = 14.9%)
and the elemental task (Bugs: M = 5.7%, SD = 17.4%,
Exceptions: M = 4.6%, SD = 15.8%).
Similarly, which reasons participants stated did not
strongly differ between participants classified to the cue ab-
straction model (or the exemplar model) across both exper-
iments. Participants classified to the cue abstraction model
slightly mentioned a combination of cues more often (M
= 59.7%, SD = 37.5%) as well as a way to calculate the
judgment (M = 6.8%, SD = 24.7%), but referred less often
to previous bugs (M = 6.4%, SD = 16.5%) or mentioned
exceptions (M = 4.5%, SD = 14.3%). In contrast, partici-
pants classified to the exemplar model more often considered
previous bugs (M = 7.7%, SD = 18.0%) or mentioned ex-
ceptions (M = 8.0%, SD = 18.4%), but less often stated they
calculated the judgment (M = 3.7%, SD = 12.8%) or that
a combination of cues was important (M = 55.6%, SD =
41.7%).
